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Hardman: "The Law"--In West Virginia
"rHE LAW" -

IN WEST VIRGINIA*

THomAs P.

HARDmAN**

The syllabus is the law. "Our constitution
requires the court to make the syllabus and
it is that which is the real decision over the

opinion."1993

How often has every West Virginia lawyer heard this argument - this supposedly authoritative theory - as to what is the
law in this jurisdiction? Sometimes one hears it propounded at the
bar; sometimes it assumes the form of a traditional belief that is
pretty much taken for granted; occasionally it puts in an appearance in judicial pronouncement. 2 That it is a wide-spread belief
is beyond question. But does it fit the realities? When we look
behind form to substance, when a spade is called a spade, is it a
theory that is generally accepted and acted upon by the court in
the everyday adjudication of eases? Is it law?
That a judicial decision has in it a directive force for deciding
future cases of a similar nature is perhaps the most fundamental
tenet of our common-law system.' Yet it is not too much to say
that there is no consensus among lawyers and judges as to just what
constitutes that elusive something which we call the law of a ease.
To be sure, everyone knows tthat the concrete decision is binding
between the parties to it. But, as everyone also knows, except a few
ultraists, 4 it is not the concrete decision as such that is law; it is
only the abstract directive force of the precedent, the constitutive
basis of prediction as to how subsequent similar cases will be de* Address (written version) delivered at the annual meeting of the West
Virginia Judicial Association, November 29, 1940.
**Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
I The quotation is an obiter dictum by Brannon, J., in Bank v. Burdette, 61
W. Va. 636, 57 S. E. 53 (1907). But see Koonce v. Doolittle, 48 W. Va. 592,
594, 37 S. E. 644 (1900): "This court only makes the more important points
of law a part of the syllabus for the general information of the lega profession
und.publi." (Italics ours.) Brannon, J., was a member of the court when
it made this pertinent observation as to the purpose and function of the syllabus
in West Virginia.
2 See, e. g., the dictum in Shenandoah Valley National Bank v. Hiett, 6 S. R.
(2d) 769, 770 (W. Va. 1939). This dictum is discussed infra in the body of
this article. Cf. Koblegard v. Hale, 60 W. Va. 37, 41, 53 S.E. 793 (1906):
"The syllabus of the case must, of course, be read in the light of the opinion."
3Cf. CARDoZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 21, 22.

The

doctrine of supremacy of law is thought by some to be equally fundamental.
See POUND, THE SPiniT oF THE COMMON LAW (1921) 182. Cf. DiO=Y, LAw OF
THE CONSTIT

ON (8th ed. 1915) Part II (The Rule of Law).

a rather extreme view see Oliphant, A Beturn to Stare Decisis (1928)
14 A. B. A. J. 71, 159.
4For

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1940

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1940], Art. 4
"THE LAW" - IN WEST VIRGINIA
cided, that is authoritative as regards the world at large. Writers
usually call this directive element the ratio decidendi. But what
is it? And how 'does one find it? And where?
That obiter dicta must first of all be dismissed as unauthoritative is of course axiomatic. "In order that an opinion may have
the weight of a precedent", as John Chipman Gray puts it in his
classic book on The Nature and Sources of the Law,' "it must be
an opinion the formation of which is necessary for the decision of
a particular case." But what statements and implications of an
opinion are essential for the decision of the precise points involved?
Few problems of the lawyer or law teacher are 9hrouded in deeper
mystery, few problems more difficult.
But let us assume that everything the court has said in a given
case is a "necessary" part of the "necessary" reasoning. H~w
does one go about the task of determining the law of the case? In
discussing this problem the leading American commentator on the
question declares with considerable confidence that there are "four
keys" to the discovery of the authoritative element of a judicial
decision. These, he says, are :
"I. The court must decide the very case before it;
H. The court must decide the case in accordance with a
general doctrine;
1Il. The words used by the court are not necessarily the doctrine of the case;
IV. The doctrine of the case must be the doctrine .that is in
the mind of the court."
"Hence", concludes this eminent jurist, "the doctrine [authoritative element] of a case is a general proposition of law from
which, taken in connection with the circumstances of the case, the
decision logically follows, and upon which, whether expressed in
the opinion or not, the court bases its decision."
But with all deference it is submitted that there are no four
keys, nor five, to the discovery of the ratio decidendi of a case.
There are, rather, certain clues that are sometimes self-sufficient
but in addition need, not infrequently, the aid of a trained intuition
that runs deeper than formulae. For the problem is, basically, the
problem of "What is Law?" And law, that is, case law, is some5 At p. 261.
6 GRAY, TE NATURE Am -SouRCES o

TE LAw (2d ed. 1921) c. 2.

For a

different view as to this see Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decdondi of a
Case (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 161.
7 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 29.
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thing more than general propositions, something more than the
rules, standards and other major-premise elements that are laid
down in or that may be deduced from the decided cases, something
more indeed than the aggregate of these basic generalizations. Law,
in the sense of the sum total of the authoritative directive force of
8
a precedent, the sense in which it is used in this discussion, is not
made up of one kind of ingredient only, as it is commonly assumed
to be; it is a compound; it is a three-ingredient compound, and two
of its ingredients are rarely spelled out in full in a single case, often
left largely inarticulate. These ingredients are, (1) basic generalizations, e.g., rules, standards, which serve, broadly speaking, as
legal major premises and which for convenience we may call, collectively and generically, principles,' (2) what many writers now
designate the technique of the courts (and administrative tribunals)
in interpreting and applying these basic principles, 10 (3) the ideals
of the time which courts and other law-adnministering agencies consciously or unconsciously employ and which thus give authoritative
direction to both principles and technique. As long ago as 188K,
Mr. Justice Holmes, in his famous book on The Common Law,
stressed the role in the judicial process of what he called "the felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy.""' More recently Mr. Justice Cardozo
and others have given fuller meaning to this important constitutive
element-this ever-present background of accepted ideas and aims
which judges, avowedly or unconsciously, unconsciously in large
part, use in coming to a particular decision, in deciding, for
example, whether to apply this prineipl or that to the case before
them, or, if there is only one apposite principle at hand, whether to
apply it narrowly or to extend it (empirically) to a novel situation, or even to lay down a new principle. 2
8 Law is a term that has at least three meanings. See Pound, What is Law?
VA. L. Q. 1.
9 These basic generalizations are commonly called rules or principles, but in
reality there are four classes of these basic elements. See POUND,Ax INTRODUCTION TO THE PmHLOSOPHY O L w (1922) 115 et seq. See also Pound, Law
ant the cience of Law in Recent Theomies (1934) 43 YALE L. J.525. These
elements are: "Rules", "principles", "standards", "conceptions".
10 See POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COmmON LAw 1: "the common law ....
is essentially a mode of judicial and juristic thinldng, a mode of treating legal
problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules." Of. Hardman, Judicial
Technique in Using the Agency Belation (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 133.
11 HOLMES, THE COMON' L&w (1881) 1.
22 See CARDozo, THE PAEADOXES OF LEoAL ScrENcE (1928) 27 et seq. At pp.
29, 30, Cardozo says: "The whole system which they [the common-law judges]
develop has been built on the assumption that it is an expression of the inores.

'(1940) 47 W.
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In general then the law of a case may be said to consist of this
three-fold directive force which serves as the authoritative basis of
prediction as to how other similar cases will be determined. Without a knowledge of each of these three interacting ingredients and
of the role each plays in the actual adjudication of cases, one is not
fully equipped to advise a client as to how a court will decide a
particular point. In other words, without this knowledge one is
not in a position to say what the law is. And the fact that a full
knowledge of this is not always possible does not argue against the
soundness of this theory; it only means, what everyone knows, that
law is not completely predictable.
How then do we isolate and evaluate this collective thing we
call the ratio decidendi? The answer can best be sought from a
study of pertinent cases and, since law is a living organism whose
"life", as Holmes put lt, "has not been logic" but "experience, ' 11
these decided cases must be looked at not as mere storehouses of
static raw materials of decision but as the embodiment of a living
generative force. They must be looked at as having at once both
reproductive power and reproductive process. The moment a decision is handed down, it becomes, in the felicitous phrase of Mr.
Justice Cardozo,"- "a new stock of descent. It is charged with vital
power. It is the source from which new principles or norms may
spring to shape sentences thereafter. If we seek the psychological
basis of this tendency, we shall find it, I suppose, in habit.", Whatever its psychological basis, it is one of the living forces of our
law."
A few West Virginia decisions chosen mostly from the field of
What has once been settled by a precedent will not be unsettlea over night, for
certainty and uniformity are gains not lightly to be sacrificed. Above all is
this true when honest men have shaped their conduct upon the faith of the pronouncement. On the other hand, conformity is not to be turned into a fetich.
. * *,There are many intermediate stages, moreover, between adherence nnd
reversal. The pressure of the mores, if inadequate to obliterate the past, may
fix direction for the future. The evil precedent may live, but so sterilized and
truncated as to have small capacity for harm. It will be prudently ignored
when invoked as an apposite analogy in novel situations, though the novel
element be small. There will be brought forward other analogies, less precise,
it may be, but more apposite to the needs of morals. The weights are constantly shifted to restore the equilibrium between precedent and justice."s See
also CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JunrcIAL PROCESS. Pound, The Iidal Rioment in American Judicial Decision (1931) 45 HARv. L. REv. 136; Pound, A
Comparison of Ideals of Law (1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 1; Pound, supra n. 8.
1s HOLMES, THE CommoN LAw 1.
14 CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIL PROCESS 22.

15f"McDougall, 'Social Psychology7, p. 354; J. C. Gray, 'Judicial
cedents' ., 9 Harvard L. Rev. 27. '
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evidence will, it is believed, suffice to illustrate what is meant-will
serve to let us focalize on the nature and source not so much of
"law in books" as of "law in action", 16 of law in its fullest author-

itative sense.
In State v. Burnett,17 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals wrote the following syllabus:
"Dying declarations, being a substitute for sworn testimony, must be such narrative statements as would be admissible had the dying person been sworn as a witness. If they
relate to facts to which the declarantcould have thus testified,
they are admissible." (Italics ours.)
In a later West Virginia case, State v. Graham,' the question
was presented as to the admissibility of a "dying declaration" containing a statement to the effect that the dying declarant and the
accused had quarreled about a month before the killing for which
the accused was indicted. The State contended that the evidence
was admissible under the syllabus in the Burnett case. The supreme
court conceded in effect that this statement in the syllabus, if law,
would let the evidence come in. And the lower court, perhaps on
the ground that the syllabus is the law in West Virginia, admitted
the evidence. But the supreme court held that it was error to admit
it. Said the court :19
"A careful examination of . . . [the Burnett] case will

disclose that the language in the syllabus is broader than the
opinion warrants ....

The statement in the syllabus that 'If

they relate to facts to which the declarant could have thus
testified, they are admissible,' is too sweeping and taken apart
from the facts stated in the opinion is inaccurate. This statement would imply that... anything he [the declarant] might
say in a dying declaration if he could give it in evidence were
he alive, would be competent evidence upon a trial of the
accused for his homicide. This is not the law, and never has
been in this state." (Italics ours.)
Here, it should be noted, the West Virginia court in so many
words not only repudiated the syllabus of a case purporting to state
a proposition of law but repudiated it on the ground that the doctrine laid down in the syllabus "is not the law, and never has been
in this state"--that it never has been the law for the reason that
16As to how "'law in books" often differs "from law in action" see Pound,
Law in Book-9 and Law in Action (1910) 44 Am. L. REv. 12.
17 47 W. Va. 731, 35 S. E. 983 (1900).
18 94 W. Va. 67, 117 S. E. 699 (1923).

29 Pp. 71, 72.
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"the syllabus is broader than the opinion warrants". Thus, in
ultimate analysis, the court found the law of the case, not in the
syllabus but elsewhere. And, what is even more significant, in order
to show that the applicable law is something other than the general
proposition set forth in the syllabus, the court cited not a single
West Virginia case but three cases from other states and two wellknown textbooks.20 Similarly, in a decision handed down on March
19, 1940, Meadow River Lumber Go. v. Easley,21 our Supreme Court
of Appeals again refused in unmistakable terms to accept as law a
proposition laid down in the syllabus of a prior decision, giving as
its reason-an incontestable reason, it is submitted-that "this
point of the syllabus, and the part of the opinion upon which it is
based, were unnecessary to the decision in that case." 22 In other
words, the court held in effect that the proposition, though promulgated in the syllabus, was obiter dictum. It seems clear, therefore,
that he fact that the court lays down a general principle whether
in th opinion or in the syllabus does not per se make it law; the
law of a case is something more than the mere ipse dixits of the
court; it is something whose authoritative force proceeds in part
from elements more interstitial and more elusive than the general
propositions which our constitution requires the court to prefix to
its opinions.
Incidentally, and yet pertinently, the same section of the West
Virginia Constitution which requires the court to prepare a syllabus also requires the court. to write an opinion, and the section
does not purport to give the syllabus any special efficacy. 23 Less
20 It
should be noted, however, that there was at least one prior West Virginia case in accord with the cases cited from the other states. See Crookham
v. State, 5 W. Va. 510 (1871).

21

7 S.E. (2d) 864 (W. Va. 1940).

22

At p. 865.

23W. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 5 provides: "When a judgment or decree is
reversed or affirmed by the supreme court of appeals, every point fairly arising
upon the record of the case shall be considered and decided; and the reasons
therefor shall be concisely stated in writing and preserved with the record of
the case; and it shall be the duty of the court to prepare a syllabus of the
points adjudicated in each case concurred in by three of the judges thereof,
which shall be prefLxed to the published report of the case." The applicable
provision of the West Virginia Code follows the Constitution. W. VA. REV.
CODE (1931) c. 58, art. 5, § 21. It might even be argued, not without a semblance of plausibility, that the constitutional requirement that the court should
write an opinion giving reasons for all points decided is more emphatic than
the requirement that the court should prepare a syllabus. At any rate the
supreme court of appeals has on several occasions made it quite clear that the
constitutional and statutory provision requiring it to prepare a syllabus is
"directory" only. See Henshaw v. Globe etc. Ins. Co., 112 W. Va. 556, 166
S. E. 15 (1932). Of. Homer v. Amick, 64 W. Va. 172, 61 S.E. 40 (1908).
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incidentally, the most compelling reason for the constitutional provision requiring the court to write a syllabus seems to have been to
do away with the old practice whereunder the syllabus was prepared by the court reporter and therefore, not infrequently, did not
24
accurately express the views of the court.
The West Virginia decisions as to the admissibility of hearsay
as a part of the so-called res gestae are particularly instructive.
In the earlier cases our court made admisgibility turn on contemporaneity so that hearsay assertions not made at the time of the
transaction which they characterized were not receivable in evidence.2" If the statement did not accompany the act but was made
later, the utterance obviously could not be said to be a part of the
act and so the rule, which was narrowly applied, could not but
exclude. In the later cases, however, our court, though still puriorting to apply the res gestae doctrine of its prior decisions, is
now, rightly enough, by a more liberal technique, letting in evidence
which under its old mode of dealing with such matters would clearly have been inadmissible. The first important case employing this
technique is Starcher v. South Penn Oil Company,5 decided in
1918. In that case A upon hearing a loud report as if from an explosion, approached the locality from which the report came and
found B lying unconscious near a broken high-pressure gas pipe
line. After an unascertained length of time B regained consciousIndeed the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has even handed down
a decision, writing an opinion, and has not prepared any syllabus at all of the
point adjudicated. See Long v. Potts, 70 W. Va. 719, 75 S. E. 62 (1912). If
the syllabus is the law in this state, may we not pertinently ask, what is the law
of the case in Long v. Potts7 Surely the ease was not decided without law
merely because the court declined to obey the "directory" constitutional
provision.
24 Of. Bank v. Burdette, 61 W. Va. 636, 57 S. E. 53 (1907); also Koonce v.
Doolittle, 48 W. Va. 592, 37 S.E. 644 (1900), as to the purpose of the syllabus.
At any rate, whatever the reason, or reasons, for the constitutional and statutory provision, the cases do not seem to indicate sufficient grounds for concluding that the intention was to give the syllabus any special efficacy as law.
If the syllabus is "the law", it is because of judge-made law, not because of
any constitutional or statutory requirement.
25 See Corder v. Talbott, 14 W. Va. 277, 290 (1878): "When the declarations are merely a narrative of a past occurrence, though made ever so soon
after the occurrence, they... constitute no part of the res gestae." Lawrence
v. DuBois, 16 W. Va. 443, 463, 464 (1880): "'Nowwhat this agent said while
in the very act of executing this agency by procuring this deed for his principal,
which indicated what the parties considered the true and real character of the
deed, would seem clearly to be evidence as a part of the res gestae.
"ISee Hawker v. B. R. & 0. R.Co., 15 W. Va. 637; Corder v. Talbott, 14 W.
Va. 277; Hanover Railroad Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. St. 402. If these declarations
had been made after the transaction had been completed, they would not have
been evidence. See Va. & Tenn. R.R. Co. v. Sayers, 20 Graft. 351."
20 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S.E.28 (1918).
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ness and replying to a question asked by A pointed to the broken
pipe line and said, "That hit me, it struck me in the back." In an
action for personal injury caused by maintaining an unsafe pipe
line it was held that the hearsay statement was admissible "as part
of the res gestae". The court reached a sound result, but by the
empiric technique of using the reasoning of the "Spontaneous Exclamations" doctrine while adhering in form to the old res gestae
rule.

27

In the latest case in point, Collins v. Equitable Life Insurance
Company,2s decided on May 28, 1940, our court employed the same
method and let in a statement made some ten minutes after the
occurrence which it characterized. The court reached this desirable
result by the simple process of saying, in the opinion, not in the
27 The court quotes at length and with approval from WIGUoRE, EVIDENOF,
(1904) 1747, which (together with allied sections) advocates the abolition of
the Res Gestae doctrine, with its limitation of contemporaneity, and the substitution of tle "Spontaneous Exclamations" doctrine which has no such
limitation and vhich has as its rationale the principle of "spontaneity".
See,
commenting onl this case, Spontaneous Rxlainations v. )es Gestae (1918) 25
IV. VA. L. Q. 341.
The old principle (without more) would not reach a sound result, so the
court in substance used another principle. Compare the following comment
from PouND, THE SPIRIT Op THE COMMON LAw 166, 167:
"When Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn had determined to rescue .Tim by digging under the cabin where he was confined, it seemed to the uninformed lay
mind of Huck Finn that some old picks the boys had found were the proper
implements to use. But Tom knew better. From reading he know what was
the right course in such cases, and he called for case-knives. 'It doesn't make
no difference,' said Tom, 'how foolish it is, it's the right way and it's the regular way. And there ain't no other way that I ever heard of, and I've read
all the books that gives any information about these things. They always dig
out with a case-knife.' So in deference to the books and to the proprieties the
boys set to work with case-knives. But after they had dug till nearly midnight
and they were tired and their hands were blistered and they had made little
progress, a light came to Tom's legal mind. He dropped his knife and, turning
to Huck, said firmly, 'Gimme a case-knife.' Let Huck tell the rest:
" 'He had his own by him, but I handed him mine. He flung it down and
says, 'Gimme a case-knife.'
" 'I didn't know just what to do - but then I thought. I scratched around
amongst the old tools and got a pickax and give it to him, and he took it and
went to work and never said a word.
" 'He was always just that particular. Full of principle.'
"Tom Sawyer had made over again one of the earliest discoveries of the
law. When legislation or tradition prescribed case-knives for tasks for which
pickaxes were better adapted, it seemed better to our forefathers, after a
little vain effort with case-knives, to adhere to principle - but use the pickax.
They granted that law ought not to change. Changes in law were full of
danger. But, on the other hand, it was highly inconvenient to use case-knives.
And so the law has always managed to get a pickax in its hands, though it
steadfastly demanded a case-knife and to wield it in the virtuous belief that
it was using the approved instrument."
28 8 S. E. (2d) 825 (W. Va. 1940).
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syllabus, that "spontaneity rather than contemporaneity" is now
the test of admissibility. Indeed the syllabus retains the old limiting language of the res gestae doctrine, viz., that a statement to be
admissible as a part of the res gestae must be "reasonably coincident with, and explanatory of, the occurrence." The applicable
principle still remains the same in form (or substantially the
same2"), but by the empiric device of using a new rationale, the
principle acquires a different directive force, a force that is just
as authoritative (i.e., court-sanctioned and therefore usable as a
premise for future judicial and juristic reasoning) and just as
operative and just as important in predictive quality as the principle itself. This of course is nothing new in the law. All commonlaw courts have used this technique to a greater or less degree. It
is one of the everyday ways by which courts effect needed changes
in the law; it is time-honored judicial empiricism; it is the commonlaw custom of putting new wine in old bottles.
To be sure, we don't always concede the existence of the custom, and when we do we are apt to express it in more conventional
phase. Even America's greatest liberal judge in his more conservative youth (at the age of forty; he was more liberal at ninety), conserved his words somewhat when he dealt with this point in what
is now a classic passage. He said :O
"The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly
corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to
be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to
which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much
upon its past."
But "the substance of the law", as distinguished from "its
form and machinery", is a far-reaching topic with which it is of
course not possible to deal in full within the limits of this discussion. Accordingly the role of the ideal element will be more or less
arbitrarily excluded from consideration except so far as it comes in

29 The syllabus reads (in full): "When appearances indicate that one
has suffered an injury, a statement by him, if spontaneous and reasonably coincident with, and explanatory of, the occurrence, may be regarded as part
True, the
of it and be competent evidence under the doctrine of res gestae."
word "spontaneous" is new, but the rule in form still has the same limitation
of contemporaneity and therefore, with respect to the point under consideration,
the rule, it would seem, remains the same in form.
3oHOLMES, TnE CommoN LAw 1, 2.
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incidentally and by way of indicating in some degree the nature
of the completed wholeh.
Perhaps a word should be said here about a rather significant
case, Shenandoah Valley National Bank v. Hiett,3 2 decided in 1939,
which seems to lend considerable credence to the theory that the
syllabus is the law in this state. In that case the question was, sufficiently for present purposes, whether an attachment affidavit
was void because of the omission of the word "justly", a supposedly indispensable term. In holding that the omission did not make
the affidavit void, the court said :13
"We are aware that the opinion in Sommers v. Allen, 44
W. Va. 120, 121, 28 S. E. 787, characterized the word 'justly'
as 'indispensable' to an attachment affidavit. But we are of
opinion that the characterization was severer than the court
contemplated because (a) the syllabus of that case (expressing
its law) said only that the omission of the word 'justly' rendered the affidavit 'bad'; (b) the earlier case of Reed v. McCloud, 38 W. Va. 701, 706, 18 S. E. 924, held that such omission
could be supplied by implication; and (e) the opinion in the
later case of Miller v. White, 46 W. Va. 67, 71, 33 S. E. 332,
333, 76 Am. St. Rep. 791, expressly declared: Attachment proceedings are not void because an affidavit fails to say that the
claim is 'just.' Accordingly, we gather from the precedents
that if the word 'justly' is not used or implied in an attachment
affidavit, it is not void but defective."
But it should be noted that even in the same breath in which
the court quotes from the syllabus of a case as "expressing its law"
the court also quotes, from the opinion of a later case, a proposition
that does not appear in the syllabus and it actually makes use of
this extra-syllabus proposition to an even greater extent than it
makes use of the syllabus. Besides, the statement in this case that
the syllabus of the earlier case "expresses its law" is, interestingly,
not in the syllabus and therefore-if the syllabus is the law-is, it
would seem, not "law". At any rate the statement was made
obiter." The case is, it is submitted, a rather typical exemplification
31 Another reason for this exclusion is the fact that the role of this legal
ingredient is touched upon at some length in another article in this issue, also
by the present writer in a previous issue. See Pound, What is Law?, the leadoff article in this issue; Hardman, Public Utilits. I. The Quest for a Concept
- Another Word (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 230.
326 S. E. (2d) 769 (W. Va. 1939).
"3 At p. 770.
34 The statement is even made in a parenthesis, which would seem to indicate
that the court did not attach particular weight to what it inserted therein. If
this parenthetical remark of the court were left out, the reasoning of the court

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol47/iss1/4
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of the general common-law technique not only in this state but,
broadly, in other common-law jurisdictions; even the word "law" is
there used, as it is often used by everyone, in something less than
an all-inclusive sense.
In discussing this general subject at a recent "Conference on
the Future of the Common Law", Lord Wright, speaking as a
representative of the highest court in England, has given us a
frank glimpse of what he thinks case law is tending to become and
therefore, to some extent, now isA' "I feel sure", he said,3" "that
the future of the common law will lie in . . . more conscious adherence to practical exigencies. . . . Law will become more and
It will dwell less on dismore self-conscious and self-critical ....
tinctions which have no realistic significance. It will be less concerned with the literal interpretation and reconciliation, in a narrow and technical spirit, of decided cases. The judges will think
more of the spirit of the decisions and will strive to mold and control them so as to serve the exigencies of social welfare and justice."
That this prophecy is already being fulfilled in West Virginia
-that our judges are in recent years, in comparison with a few
decades ago, "thinking more of the spirit of the decisions", and are
"less concerned with the literal interpretation and reconciliation,
in a narrow and technical spirit, of decided cases "-is excellently
illustrated, and perhaps nowhere better indicated than in that class
of cases dealing with the rule that if a writing is not ambiguous.
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show what the parties meant
by it; it must speak for itself.3 7 This rule, though once applied
rather "narrowly" by the West Virginia court, and though still rewould still be quite complete. The parenthetical statement was therefore, it
would seem, "unnecessary" for the decision of the precise point involved in
the case. Hence, it must be classed as obiter.
Perhaps it should also be noted here that the statement by Brannon, J., in
the opening paragraph of the body of this article, indicating that the syllabus
is the law in West Virginia, is likewise a proposition that does not appear in
the syllabus of the case in which it was used, and, in addition, it was made
obiter.
35 "In order to know what it [the common law] is, we must know what it
has been, and what it tends to become." HOLMES, TiE COMMON LAW 1.
38 Lord Wright in THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW, HARVARD TERCENTENANy PUBLICATIONS (1936) 116, 117.
37 See Uhl v. Ohio River Ry., 51 W. Va. 106, 41 S. E. 340 (1902). The court
states the rule thus (in the syllabus): "If a writing is not ambiguous, it must
speak for itself by its words, without aid of any oral evidence; but if it is
ambiguous, oral evidence is admissible to show the occasion of the contract,
the situation of the parties, the circumstances surrounding them, their subsequent acts in executing the contract, in order to show their intention in making it; but evidence cannot be received to show their declarations, conversations
or interlocutions before or at the execution of the contract."
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tained in form, is now taking on a new directive force that is
making the law of today something quite different in substance
from the law of yesterday. Bragg v. Peytona Lumber Company,5
decided in 1926, is a landmark case on this point. But a still better
example, for illustrative purposes, is the highly important case of
Hodge v. Garten,5 decided in 1935, in which the West Virginia
court carried this liberalizing technique still further. In that case
there was a written contract purporting to sell "all mining posts
that the party of the first part has made and now has on hands."
The party of the first part (the plaintiff) had made and at the time
had on hand mining posts in six different localities. The defendant
claimed that the contract was intended to cover only the mining
posts in two of those localities, namely, at Nickelville and at Huddleston farm, and to prove this claim he offered evidence (1) that
prior to the execution of the contract the parties had gone to those
two localities to examine the posts, and (2) that at the time of the
execution of the contract, the defendant gave the plaintiff a check
for $500.00 as part payment and that on this check there was the
notation: "$500 payment on mine props at Nickelville and Huddleston farm".
Is this evidence admissible ? If the law as to this in West Virginia is to be found alone in any general proposition or propositions
laid down by the court the conclusion seems inescapable that the
evidence cannot come in.
In disposing of the question of admissibility in this case the
court wrote a syllabus which contains only the following proposition: "Extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain an ambiguity
38

102 W. Va. 587, 135 S. E. 841 (1926).

In this case there was a written

contract providing as follows with respect to the cutting of poles which constituted the subject matter of the transaction: "The said poles are to conform
in every way to what is known as 'Class B Chestnut Pole specifications'."
There were standard Class B Chestnut Pole specifications as understood in the
market generally and these had certain minimum dimensions. In other words,
the language used in the written instrument had a definite "normal meaning 1.
so that extrinsic evidence is not admisIs the language then "unambiguous"
sible to disturb the so-called "plain normal meaning" of words? In disposing
of the admissibility of evidence of former dealings between the parties, including a former contract, the court adhered in the syllabus to the old ambiguity rule [the rule as laid down in the syllabus reads as follows: "Parol
evidence of former dealings between the parties, as well as their acts subsequent
to the execution of the contract, are admissible to. explain an expression in said
contract which is ambiguous."], but the court by a changed technique, discoverable largely between the lines - in the interstices of the decision - let
the evidence in, and held, in effect, that the language in question meant something different from the standard Class B poles as understood in the market
generally.
39 116 W. Va. 564, 182 S. E. 582 (1935).
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appearing on the face of a contract." Query, then, is there any
ambiguity in the phrase "all mining posts that the party of the
first part has made and now has on hands"? Though the court said
ipssimis verbis that a more comprehensive word than all cannot be
found in the English language, yet it let the evidence in and held
that the words "all... posts that the party... now has" on hand
did not include all the posts he had but only a part. That is to say,
the word "all", though admittedly a more comprehensive word
cannot be found in our language, is "ambiguous". Which is another way of saying, in the words of the Restatement of the Law
of Contracts, that "all language will bear some different meanings". 40 This is sound of course. But by its technique in dealing
with the ambiguity doctrine our court has quite obviously given the
applicable principle a new directive force; it has added, empirically, to the authoritative raw materials which courts and lawyers
and law teachers will use in determining the law of that case and
so in determining the law applicable to subsequent similar fact
situations-it has added to the authoritative basis of prediction
41
which is the essence of law.
It would seem then that, speaking broadly, we may say of the
law in West Virginia what America's greatest judge said of law
in the well-kmown case of Lochner v. New York :42 "General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a
judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major
premise." It is true that Holmes was there dealing with a question
of constitutional law. And it is also true that in constitutional-law
4o See RESTATEIENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §§ 230, 235 (including Comments).
See also 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 629; WiG ORE, EVIDENCE
(3d ed. 1940) § 2470: "The truth had finally to be recognized that words
always need interpretation."
This does not mean of course that all relevant
evidence is admissible to explain so-called "unambiguous"
words. "There
is one forbidden variety."
See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2471 et seg., as to inadmissible "Declarations of Intention".
41 For a detailed discussion of the technique of the West Virginia court in
applying the so-called "ambiguity rule", see Hardman, A Problem in Interpretation (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 110.
For a discussion of another class of decisions (including some West Virginia
cases) in which courts by a somewhat similar procedure give an old doctrine
a new content, see Hardman, Judicial Technique in Using the Agency Belation
(1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 133. In one group of cases there discussed the West
Virginia court applies the agency doctrine of responeatsuperior so as to bring
the non-agency "family purpose" automobile cases within the rule - another
instance of judicial empiricism. See (perhaps the best illustration of this
technique) Jones v. Cook, 90 W. V&a. 710, 716, 111 S. E. 828 (1922): "It is
not a new graft on the law of agency. It is merely applying old principles to
new conditions."
42 198 U. S. 45, 76, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905).
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cases "general propositions", the law's major premises, play a less
important role than in most fields of the law. But the difference
is one of degree, as indeed most legal distinctions are.43 In constitutional law, where the interests to be secured are constantly
changing, it is the ideals of the time and the technique of the courts
that usually play the leading roles. In real property, the other extreme of the law, where the interests involved are all but unvarying,
general propositions almost crowd everything else off the legal
stage, almost but not quite. In the fields between, in evidence for
instance where the conflicting interests run the whole gamut from
the need for certainty to the equally important if paradoxical need
for change, general propositions play a variant role, dependent on
the kind of interests that are at stake and on the long-run views of
the court, avowed or unexpressed, as to what interests are paramount in the particular class of cases. But there is always an
accent, though often a secondary one, at times an unconscious one,
on something more subtle than legal major premises. Law is not
rooted in general propositions alone: it is rooted in judicial empiricism - in ideals, in judicial technique.
4

3
Of. Holmes, J., in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 631, 26 S. Ct. 525,
553, 50 L. Ed. 867 (1906).
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